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Mind, space and objectivity
in non-human animals
----------
There are many diverse, and sometimes conflicting motives for studying animal 
minds. Ethology aims at describing and explaining animal behavior.  Evolutionary 
biology is focussing on the functions that appear in phylogeny, such as cognitive 
perception, learning and social communication. Popular essays want to entertain 
the readers with moving stories. Moralists  explore animal rights. Animal trainers 
try to increase learning efficiency. Philosophy looks for an explanation of mind in 
general, i.e. mentality as it appears in all animals, human or non-human. One of 
the primary intuitions on which the present contribution  draws is that an 
explanation of the human mind that ignores the conditions in which minds 
appeared earlier in phylogeny in non-linguistic animals tends to emphasize non-
necessary features while   forgetting crucial ones. 
If one choses to study minds "in general"  through the notion of  a linguistic 
representation, as does Davidson among others, one begs a variety of important 
questions : what are the early forms of representation that deserve to be called 
mental? What makes a representation a representation of an object, as 
contrasted, for example, with a representation of a feature of an individual's 
experience ? How constitutive are  the capacities of exchanging information, of 
using tools or of solving problems in possessing   minds ? What is the difference 
between mentality and intelligence ?
 If one looks at animal minds from above, so to speak, one tends to consider 
language, as Descartes did, as a necessary condition for developing a thought 
having the characteristics of creativity and of systematicity that underly human 
thought. (Creativity is the property of linguistic systems to allow the construction of 
ever new sentences ; systematicity is the feature in virtue of which grasping one 
sentence involves grasping all the sentences with the same structure, for an 
invariant lexicon). True, language entails the capacity of forming  and of 
understanding any among an  infinity of sentences. But is that a necessary 
component for mentality ? And if so, is that capacity restricted to external-language 
users ?
As ethologists know well, it is nearly inevitable to project human categories and 
preferred metaphysics onto an animal's world.  This latter worry does not refer only 
to the popular subjectivist claim that  animals, having no words and probably only 
rudimentary concepts, and often intriguingly exotic sensory mechanisms, do not in 
fact "look at" their world in the way we describe it, and that, therefore, we shall 
never really understand "how it feels" to be them. It articulates the more interesting 
issue that an animal may entertain representational states that are in no way 
mental states. Using a language of independent things and events may lead us to 
mistake the human, mentalistic, way of representing, with early biological 
representational functions that do not involve possessing a mind. The present 
essay attempts at formulating general constraints for a representation to be 
mental. Such constraints should   allow characterizing the differences between, 
say, an aplysia  instantiating internal - but non-mental - representations of an 
external condition, and a rat entertaining an internal and  mental representation of 
food location.
*
*   *
Kandel & Hawkins' work on a mollusc named Aplysia will help us introduce this 
crucial distinction. This invertebrate possesses respiratory organs including a gill 
located in a mantle cavity recovered with a protective sheet, named the mantle 
shelf , whose extremity constitutes the siphon. Now when the latter is stimulated by 
touch, all the respiratory organs withdraw into the mantel cavity in virtue of a 
defensive reflex. Now what is important is that this reflex can indeed be modified 
by learning : in habituation, the animal will learn to ignore a repeated tactile 
stimulus, whereas in sensitization it will learn to strenghten its response and 
trigger it for weaker stimuli. Aplysiae can also be conditioned to withdraw their 
siphons when their tails receive shocks. Thus they present capacities for learning 
that were until recently considered as specific of vertebrates,  in a process that 
presents a temporal pattern  analogous to the  vertebrates' conditioning pattern.
These authors suggest that elementary neuronal mechanisms, as found in an 
aplysia and responsible for sensitization and habituation in this animal's behavior, 
are also at work in higher-order features of learning, such as first- and second-
order conditioning, blocking, latent inhibition etc. In their view, conditioning would 
thus rely on a combination of cellular mechanisms that are already present in very 
simple organisms. Now what is of interest for us is the notion of representation that 
is being used by Kandel & Hawkins, as well as by most neuroscientists : in their 
view, a particular change in neurotransmitter at a certain locus  of sensory 
neurons (Ca++ channels) provides the animal with "an internal representation of 
the world".  In what sense is it justified to consider the new state of the sensory 
neurons as representing the world ? Should we take it that aplysiae already have 
mental representations ? 
Obviously, there is some nomological covariation between  the application on 
the siphon of a sequence of stimuli in a certain temporal pattern and a specific 
change in the sensory neurons that affect themselves gill and siphon motor 
neurons. Using the definition for a representation suggested by Fred Dretske 
(1986), this internal state seems to qualify as a representation because :
1) There is a nomological covariation between that state and some other external 
condition, in virtue of which the former indicates  the latter (i.e. carries information 
on the presence of the latter).
2) The internal indicator has further the function to indicate the external condition 
; in other words, evolution selected the neuronal mechanism causally responsible 
for habituation and sensitization because such a mechanism helped the 
organisms to react in a more flexible way to changes in the environment that 
simpler mechanisms such as tropisms, i.e. orientation mechanisms could afford.
Yet we may be reluctant to attribute to the animal something like the belief  that 
"there is  in the outer world a non-threatening object in contact with my siphon", or 
some equivalent expression for it. For one thing, it seems odd to say that aplysiae  
entertain representations about the world that could be mistaken.  Now as was 
rightly stressed by Dretske (1988), the ability to misrepresent is part and parcel of 
the capacity of representing. For a representation has the essential feature that it 
is semantically evaluable ; it can be true or false. Naturally, as is the case for every 
function, the function which is performed by the Ca++  channels can be 
misperformed, if, for example, the animal suffers from a lack of calcium. In such a 
case, the animal could fail to habituate or sensitize. But there is a good reason 
why we are not  tempted to say, in that case, that the animal misrepresented the 
world. The very idea of a contrast  between an inner representing state and an 
external, represented condition  seems superimposed on the description of the 
learning process by the human interpreter, rather than intrinsic to the animal's 
internal indicators function.  Such a contrast requires as its precondition that the 
animal be able to semantically evaluate its own representational states, in other 
words that it should be able to correct them adequately when faced with contrary 
evidence. Speaking of a 'semantical evaluation' should not suggest that the 
animal is able, so to speak, to exercise a logical competence  and inter alia, apply 
the concept of truth. It is only meant to suggest that a representational skill 
involves aiming at veridicality, and using when necessary corrective procedures to 
achieve veridicality.
One might try to capture the distinction between the kind of crude, "proto- 
representation" that the aplysia  instantiates and representation understood as a 
contentful, true-or-false,  picture of the world, by using Fred Dretske's contrast 
between what he calls a  "phylogenetic" representation and an "ontogenetic" one. 
In the former case, a neuronal state has a representational value in virtue of the 
history of the species to which the individual organism belongs ; in the second 
case, it acquires its representational value in virtue of the particular history of the 
individual. As Dretske (1988) shows at length, a representation can influence the 
animal's behavior in virtue of its content in the ontogenetic variety only.  For only 
then is the representational content meaningful for the individual organism. Only 
then is the corresponding representation specifically mental.
 But even if this distinction can work in the way suggested, we see immediately 
that this distinction will not do the job we expect from it in our present case. For the 
aplysia that habituates is the individual aplysia, confronted with its own individual 
perceptual history. It is through its previous encounters with the stimulus that it 
reaches the point of habituation (or of sensitization). Replacing this aplysia with 
another, we would not get the same connection between a given stimulus and a 
particular motor output : the internal state triggered by the stimulus would have a 
different representational content. Still, one is not prepared to accept the view that 
either of the aplysiae  (the "learned" and the "naive" ones) represent the world. 
Accordingly, we are not ready to say that they form mental  representations. It 
seems that conditioning is a function that can involve, or fail to involve, 
representations, in virtue of the cognitive capacities that are, or fail to be, present 
in the type of organism under investigation. Therefore we cannot conclude from 
learning to any  involvement of mental function.
It is clear that our philosophical account of intentionality, i.e. of the property of 
some internal states to be about external conditions,  still lacks  an explanation of 
what   the difference is between a representation that covaries with some external 
state and a representation that is about that state. In  traditional philosophy, 
objectivity   names the property of a representation that distinguishes in some 
principled way what belongs to a subject's experience, from what belongs to the 
object of her experience.  Using the term "experience" in the case of an aplysia is 
obviously problematic: we don't know whether that animal receives information 
from its receptors in any qualitative format, i.e. whether its perceptual states 
include any phenomenological content. But we can rephrase the problem of 
objectivity in more general terms in order to accommodate this case: is it possible 
to specify in a non-question begging way the conditions in which  a representation 
refers to an external object (a distal stimulus) and those in which it refers to some 
sensory input at the level of its own receptors ( a proximal stimulus) ?  
As we saw earlier, a mental representation must be such that it can represent 
(and fail to represent) adequately the world. This strange capacity seems to 
involve in some sense the ability to "reach out to the world", i.e. to respond to 
conditions in the world and not simply to  some "proximal" state in the  organism's 
receptors. The difference between proximal and distal information is indeed a 
crucial one, in that it characterizes  the way knowledge is being organized in this 
system. Habituation, sensitization and learning are produced at the neuronal 
level, by chemical changes in the synapses. This is true whether the information 
that is extracted is  proximal or distal. The difference is not to be looked for in the 
brain chemistry, but in the type and use of the information available to that 
particular organism.  In a system that relies on proximal information pick up, the 
world plays no particular role, besides causing some perturbations in the 
receptors. Only the dynamics in the inputs is relevant to determine the next state in 
the organism. By contrast, an organism that can pick up distal information, is also 
able to store its knowledge not only in the form of its own dynamics, but also by 
relying on the organization of the world itself. Distal representations  allow the 
organism to identify stable objects and changing properties, and to predict events 
in the world, and not only to adjust its internal states by way of feedback. 
Common sense deals with the problem of objectivity in a metaphoric way, where 
spatial and functional considerations are mingled : one simply contrasts what 
happens "in the head" and "outside it", or, what belongs to "the system"  and what 
belongs to its surroundings. But commonsense begs the question, by relying on a 
form of representation - spatial concepts, in particular the opposition within/without 
- to explain representational skills in non-human minds. As we saw, experimental 
psychology also presupposes space to distinguish proximal and distal stimuli. 
Now, spatial concepts fail to offer a solution, when what is at stake is an 
explanation of this very usage of spatial relations to distinguish different sources of 
incoming information. Therefore a naturalistic explanation of animal minds must 
offer a non-question begging account for how space comes to be, so to speak, 
internalized by a system ; and for how the  internal/external distinction, in some 
sense, orients the whole process of forming mental representations.
A philosopher who has to solve the problem of objectivity in the context of 
explaining what mental representations are in non-linguistic animals is loaded 
with two further constraints : he has to tackle the problem in the most austere way, 
by relying only on the kind of information  which a non-linguistic animal can 
extract, and by avoiding considerations that would involve the preliminary mastery 
of mental representations ( the notion to be defined).
*
*      *
The first, and main, difficulty, is to understand why space offers a privileged way 
of capturing  objectivity. Fortunately, work by Peter Strawson (Strawson, 1959) 
and Gareth Evans (Evans, 1985) can offer us significant help in this intrincate 
question. They show that all that is required for someone to be able to distinguish 
what one's own representation  from the independent entity that  is being 
represented, is the capacity of forming a particular scheme where the existence of 
perceptual elements is independent of the existence of one's own states. In other 
words, this capacity involves the capacity of  reidentifying  a particular in a 
reference frame. Your experience is not confused with its object when the 
disappearance of the object from sight, say, does not prevent you from having the 
representation of its continued existence.  From this observation, Strawson tries to 
establish whether space as such is a necessary ingredient for reidentifying a 
particular : would  a purely auditory world - a world in which we suppose that no 
spatial information is available, only a succession of auditory events - would allow 
one to  recognize, when  certain regularity conditions  obtain, some reidentifiable 
particulars ? Strawson claims that indeed, all that is required is the existence of a 
specific order  constraining the sequence of instantaneous experiences, an order 
that applies over and above the type of relations that derive from the particular 
nature of each element. In the exclusively auditory world imagined by Strawson for 
his thought experiment, the kind of formal order required to achieve objectivity 
could consist in the presence of a master sound, accompanying the individual 
sounds, and changing pitch level in some systematic fashion. 
To this, Evans, in a nutshell,  objects that Strawson's auditory particulars   would 
not offer the features of strong numerical discernability that one needs to reidentify 
a particular thing as distinct from another. Such a world would provide at best the 
conditions for qualitative identity, but not for numerical identity, which is needed for 
reidentifying particulars.  Evans seems right to insist that something more than 
pure sequential regularity is needed for a subject to have the sense of an external 
world, independent from its experience. But Evans adds that only a substantial 
notion of causation can indeed account for that "independent from" relationship 
(between my experience and its object, or between my representation and what it 
is about). According to him, only an organism able to understand that the features 
of his experience are indeed caused by the things that are at the informational 
source of the experience can identify independent particulars. If this was true, then 
we would have to conclude that most non-linguistic animals fail to achieve 
objectivity, insofar as they fail to possess and use causal concepts. Another 
consequence of Evans' point is that we could not "naturalize" both intentionality 
and objectivity, each having in the other its own foundation.
But we are not stuck by Evans' objection to Strawson, for there is another way of 
showing what gives space a special role in the acquisition of objectivity.  The step 
that Evans misses is that there is another kind of constraints that holds in ordinary 
physical space, besides the causal organization of facts, and that explains why 
space is a privileged medium for discerning entities in a numerical way. This other 
kind of constraints are linked to the way multisensory perceptual inputs are put 
together in each instantaneous perceptual manifold. Space as intuitively 
conceived is a kind of empty setting for possible perceptual contents.  But it can 
also be understood as a set of formal properties characterising necessarily the 
relations between possible inputs.  While a perceptual system that processes  only 
one kind of sensory input cannot establish any kind of relations  between kinds of 
inputs, a more complex perceptual system, harnessed to a more sophisticated set 
of cognitive functions, may extract formal relations between inputs and exploit 
them for the purposes of categorizing input spatially. Let us call perceptual 
conditions of correction such a set of constraints. The point I will make in this 
paper is that the ability of applying perceptual conditions of correction on the 
sensory inputs is an essential dimension in the capacity for  forming and using 
mental representations, i.e. representations meeting the criterion of objectivity in 
the sense indicated above.
Let us take stock. From the case of aplysia, we inferred intuitively that this animal 
fails to form mental representations. We argued that such a capacity would have 
implied the capacity of objectivity ; the latter in turn was shown to presuppose a 
spatial constraint ; but this constraint can be articulated as a set of   conditions of 
correction at the level of perceptual input. Competence in applying these 
conditions involves in an animal a capacity of   correcting its perceptual inputs. 
Now one important supplementary condition has to be made explicit, before we 
articulate more finely in what perceptual conditions of correction might consist.  
While exploring the role of correction in objectivity, it should be emphasized that 
the relevant corrections must be effected quite generally, and not as a matter of 
chance, motivation, or as a consequence of a particular circumstance. This 
condition is called by philosophers "the generality principle". This principle is quite 
important for determining the scope of mental capacities, as distinct from other 
functional capacities. The simple fact that an organism can act in the world and 
direct responses to external objects and events in a spatially adequate way, or 
even that it displays an aptitude at   correcting its trajectory in the relevant manner, 
is not enough to attribute to it a capacity for representing objectively the world. Let 
us use here a parallel with linguistic competence. Every animal owner knows that 
an animal can "understand" an utterance without understanding the language to 
which this utterance belongs. When you call your dog with the words "Come here", 
he may come to you and thus display in some modest way an understanding of 
your utterance. But you don't want to say that your dog understands English. He 
only has a partial, so to speak atomic, capacity, or in other words his linguistic 
capacity is not structured. 
In an analogous way, an organism may have a partial, atomic capacity to control 
its motions towards or away from a specific location, without having a structured 
capacity to use spatial information in any systematic way. For example, a coastal 
snail can rely on geotaxis and phototaxis to reach the point under water that is 
most adequate for its survival, without having any kind of access to spatial 
information as such. Just as only a structured capacity can explain language 
production, only such a capacity can account for the spatial competence relevant 
for objectivity. 
The notion of a structured competence is linked to the constraint of generality, in 
virtue of which a mental or cognitive competence should be able to deal with any 
kind of circumstance in its domain; for example a speaker who knows the meaning 
of "here" must be able to apply the word at any point of space where himself is 
located. Some philosophers defend the view that the very capacity to move in and 
act on the world is a sufficient condition for exercising spatial concepts. Having 
done it elsewhere at length, I will not  discuss here the relevance of action to 
spatial concept acquisition. Let me only say this. It is certainly not enough to say 
that every being that interacts with objects displays a structured capacity for 
representing the world objectively. It is clear that the motor program that governs a 
response can be interpreted in proximal informational terms or in distal ones. A 
fixed action pattern, for example, boils down to activating some stereotyped motor 
responsein response to predetermined sensory inputs. The success of a 
movement does not prove that distal information was used, nor that any kind of 
concept or protoconcept was used, and was causally efficacious in the 
performance of the movement.
*
*     *
The idea that there are formal links in the perceptual layout that can be extracted 
in a tacit, quick and entirely subpersonal way is not new. It brings us at least back 
to an unjustly neglected era of philosophical enquiry named logical positivism. 
Whereas Carnap, an eminent member of the Vienna Circle project, defended a 
view of the possibility of logically deriving knowledge from sense-data that is no 
longer defensible, he devoted considerable care to extracting the logical relations 
that hold between perceptual constituants, and made pionneering work in an area 
known today as multidimensional scaling in the psychology of perception (Clark, 
1993). Let me quickly give you some idea of what Carnap (1928) attempted to do 
in his effort to provide a logical reconstruction of the world.  Let us suppose with 
Carnap that a subject - or some subpersonal system in an organism - can 
memorize relations of similarity between the sensory elements of his various 
instantaneous experiences. For example, the green of the thuja appears to him to 
be like the green of the cypress, the fragrance of the rose similar to the lilac's and 
different from the hellebore's. With the corresponding extensions of the relation of 
what Carnap calls "memory resemblance" (in that it contains both information on 
earlier/later and on more or less similar), the subject builds classes of 
phenomenal qualities.
But those various classes are distinguishable not only through their phenomenal 
properties, but also through their formal  ones. (In fact, a theorist only has the 
formal properties, and not the phenomenal ones, and is supposed to reconstruct 
classes of classes of inputs - like color, visual modality, or pitch, and auditory 
modality - only using the relations between perceptual events). Among them is the 
class of properties that constitute the conditions of correction of a perceptual field. 
Indeed the apparent locations in the perceptual field associated to each sensory 
quality do entertain a specific relation: each one belongs to an equilocality class.
For example, being located at the center of the subject's visual field can be true 
of various qualitative properties, such as color, smell, sound. But each of them has 
to be instantiated by only one token of the same class at that location. Whereas a 
given fragrance can belong to various locations of that visual field, both inside and 
across experiences, being at a  particular location is a property that holds uniquely 
for  one  of each set of properties at a particular time. An element located at P can 
have only one color, say red, (and not any other color) ; it has one olfactory 
property, one texture, one auditory property. All the non-red, (etc.)  elements  have 
to be in some other location. This formal property has been called antitypy : it 
means "either exclusive or identical", and is applied to classes of sensory qualities 
formed from complex sensory events (using a similarity relation).
Now this apparently complicated property can be grasped in a practical way if 
1) there is the corresponding information in the animal's perceptual field, and 2) 
the organism is equipped with a mechanism  able to extract it. 
1) The information that an animal uses to extract conditions of correction of his 
perceptual layout is in part made possible by the world being what it is : objects 
have stable properties until something changes them, and when some quick 
change happens, it takes place at a time at a certain location (except in quantum 
physics, but this should not bother us at the macrolevel where the animal's world 
is located). If one assume, as I think safe to do, that an animal's environment 
contains objects and properties as well as individual events involving them, we 
have the source of the information that the animal can use, if he is equipped to 
extract it, even in the absence of a capacity for causal reasoning. The information 
in question is of the kind described above in formal terms : an event has definite 
spatio-temporal coordinates ; a thing is or is not in front of me ; it has or does not 
have a particular color, as well as other qualitative  properties (audition, smell, 
touch, etc.). What I touch should be located at the same spot as what I see, if the 
two share some other invariants (like the spatio-temporal dynamics, or the shape, 
etc.).
2)  Now what kind of capacity can meet all the requirements for a structured 
competence for checking the conditions of correction of the perceptual inputs ? I 
want to defend the view that  an animal equipped with a perceptual set of 
mechanisms called "calibration-recalibration" has ipso facto  fulfilled one of the 
crucial conditions for having  representations  of the world. Such a mechanism in 
effect is a device for correcting modal-specific inputs when they fail to be spatially 
coherent with each others. It is obviously a practical skill (or tacit competence), in 
the sense that the animal does not need to know that he has those mechanisms to 
actually use them. This skill is not the result of any learning. It develops very early 
in the animal's life, as a result of evolutionary pressures for achieving a more 
reliable perceptual system, i.e. more efficient in action. Concrete case analyses 
will help me to make this point clearer. In the aplysiae,    there is no general 
mechanism for correcting sensory inputs that would allow them to conform to the 
formal equilocality constraints. In many invertebrates, the only procedure for 
integrating sensory inputs is an additive mechanism. Intensities of sensory events 
in different modalities are summed, and potentiating and depotentiating effects 
result directly from the inputs being summed. 
Now in other animals, such as birds, reptiles, mammals, there is such a general 
mechanism, allowing the animal to correct its own modal-specific sensory 
receptors in order to respect equilocality constraints in its perceptual layout. Work 
by Knudsen (1982) reported in Gallistel (1990)  shows for example how a young 
owl whose correspondence between visual and auditory stimulus representation 
(in the tectum) has been experimentally distorted (through a plug in one ear) will 
restore spatial congruence : "the projection of the auditory stimulus onto the 
tectum gradually changes so as to bring the effect of a sound back in register with 
the effect of a visual stimulus originating at the same angular deviation" (Gallistel, 
1990, p. 481). This calibration  process is important for us because it exemplifies 
one feature that, as we saw,  a representational system must have in order to be 
able to form "objective"  representations. This mechanism allows the animal to 
correct its sensory inputs in order to put them into one single spatially coherent 
perceptual frame. It seems that such a capacity of extracting crossmodal spatially 
coherent information results in part from the existence of multisensory neurons. 
Calibration is the operation through which a perceiving subject modifies the 
reception of one or several matching sensory inputs to exploit coherently the 
spatial information they contain. Crossmodal adaptation does more that 
introducing coherence to the content of any particular experience ; it also thereby 
makes possible an objective perception of the world.
Now let us check whether calibrations does fulfill the conditions that need to be 
fulfilled for the representing system to achieve representational objectivity.
 
1 -  Calibration as a structured capacity.
Calibration does respect the constraint of generality. Spatial calibration for 
sensory inputs can be effected from any point, and will apply to any point of the 
perceptual field. It is also general in the sense that it can be effected from any 
modality to any other, (when certain conditions obtain, see 3 below). Moreover, 
the generalisation of the effect of calibration is linear, in the sense that its effects 
do not depend on their distance from the point where non-matching inputs 
occurred.  
2 - Calibration organizes the perceptual field in a way that respects equilocality 
constraints.
Calibration checks on the equilocality conditions in the sensory content, in order 
to identify and distinguish from one another possible external events. The rules of 
correction for local identification are 
a) that there is not more than one spatially coherent sensory event in one point of 
space at one time, and
b) that if there are two simultaneous spatially coherent sensory events, they fail to 
be equilocal.
3-  Calibration is the capacity of correcting if necessary the inputs when they 
violate the equilocality constraints.
What are the characteristics of the information that dominates the others ? The 
dominance of a signal of a certain modality depends less on the intrinsic 
properties of a sensory  channel than on the quality of the spatial information that it 
conveys. Ordinarily, in man and in most mammals, vision dominates audition. But 
in particular circumstances, a subject can recalibrate his vision on his audition. 
The conditions that favor one modality over another have to do with the intensity of 
the signal and with the quality of the spatial information it conveys. For example, 
vision fails to dominate audition if the visual field is weakly structured.
The same kind of flexibility according to context is found in the width of the 
temporal window that is used to fuse together two sensory events as a signal for 
one single external event. Stein and Meredith, in their book The Merging of the 
senses,  (1993) claim that most intersensory interactions last 100 msecs and are 
optimal for most neurons at this interval. But interaction vision-audition may last up 
to 1500 msecs. This allows identifying as a single external event sensory events 
issued by distant referents, distance aggravating the temporal gap between visual 
and auditory stimuli.
These empirical facts illustrate a philosophically important point, that is that 
veridicality in perception does not depend on any permanent feature in the world 
being extracted in some fixed way. It depends each time crucially on a gradient of 
reliability of the various sources of information. That this gradient of reliability is 
centered on spatial location is not surprising if we think of the requirements of 
survival related to spotting a predator, a nutrient, or a mate.
4 -  Calibration  operates  in a principled way.
When equilocal stimuli fall inside the receptor field of a multisensory neuron, 
their combined effect is multiplicative, whereas non equilocal stimuli will fall inside 
the receptor field of an inhibitory multisensory neuron, which will allow more 
sensory disparity to be experienced.  This effect allows a predator or a prey to be 
sensitive to food or danger even in low intensities of plurimodal signals. But all 
that needs to concern the philosopher is that the capacity for (re)calibration is 
structured in a reliable way. Calibration is the one tiny mechanism that fits all the 
intentional pieces together, and allows an animal to maintain a coherent 
representation of a world of independent objects and events.
Whatever their fine-tuning for habituation, sensitization and conditioning, 
Aplysiae  do not have the proper means for identifying spatially  incoherent 
incoming signals. If for example, we fiddle the proximal stimuli in an aplysia or in a 
coastal snail, the poor animal will have to go with the evidence it has; it will be 
steering its way  using  simple rules such as : " go away from the light when 
crawling upon a  horizontal  surface ; go to the light when crawling hanging down 
from the underside of a horizontal surface" (Gallistel, 1980, 158). But a bird whose 
one ear is plugged can overwrite the proximal stimuli in order to maintain its 
access to distal stimuli. As we saw, he does it by using perceptual recalibration. 
This device changes the very nature of representational capacity : the information 
being used is not any more centered on the perceiving subject that uses it ; it is 
centered on the distal source that provides it. This devices brings about 
representational objectivity : thanks to it, a mind can think about the world in a 
detached way. Now such a model has to make clear that it does not fall prey to 
circularity : the burden   on us is to show that recalibration does not involve any 
use of a mental representation.
*
*   *
The threat of circularity is, as we saw, one of the main difficulties that one faces 
when trying to explain intentionality. If it was the case that perceptual conditions of 
correction presuppose conceptual ability, then we would be caught in a vicious 
circle :  in order to be able to recalibrate a sensory event,  an animal  should 
already have categorized that object or event. If this was the case, calibration 
would suppose  that representations are already at work, and could not without 
circularity contribute to forming a representational capacity.
 Specialists in the alignment of sensory maps now consider that the spatial 
matching  effected between crossmodal data is innate. Blind babies orient their 
eyes in a way that is spatially coherent with the sounds they hear. It is now 
hypothesized that the mechanism of crossmodal adaptation used in recalibration 
was selected because it "lends coherence to, but is independent of, the   content 
of any particular experience" (Butterworth, quoted in Stein and Meredith, 1993,  p. 
14).  In the case of spatial information, independence  is grounded in the 
separation of neural pathways for processing spatial and semantic information : 
dorsal cortical neurons deal with location of events, and  ventral ones deal with 
the semantic properties of those events. Now what is of importance for us is that 
finding the location of an event is what makes possible the grasp of numerical 
identity of that event. This in turn allows the fact that other properties can hang on 
that numerical identity. We here have the neurophysiological ground for the 
functional distinction  between an object and its properties.
Now someone could object that, even though there are separate pathways for 
spatial and semantic information, still a perceiving animal  tries to grasp the 
characteristics, useful or dreadful, of an external event. In that case, it must 
already have categorized that object or event to attribute to it a certain probability 
of appearance at a certain location. This objection would be relevant if 
recalibration depended for its operation on an organism's expectations. Some 
authors, like Welch and Warren (1980) made the hypothesis that human subjects 
recalibrated their perceptual inputs because they were expecting to perceive 
some particular event or object. Again, if this was the case, calibration would 
suppose that representations are already at work, and could not, without 
circularity,  be said to contribute to forming a representational capacity.  But this 
hypothesis turned out to be false. Work on the ventriloquism effect in human 
subjects comforts the view that recalibration is a modular, cognitively impenetrable 
mechanism. Radeau and Bertelson (1977) show that the same adaptive after-
effects obtain after crossmodal conflict, whether the situations used are realist or 
not, and whether the subjects are told or not that there is a spatial conflict in the 
sensory inputs. ( In a realist situation, subjects see a face and listen to a voice, or 
see the hands of a musician and hear the music they produce. In a non-realist 
situation, subjects see meaningless lights and sounds. Signals in both cases are 
synchronous but spatially separated by 20°).  The current state of research should 
then lead us to take calibration to be a purely modular, perceptual, non-
conceptual ability. Now let us try to understand what is the connection between 
that perceptual mechanism and intentionality.
*
*   *
The contrast between an aplysia and, say, an owl, in respect to their 
representational capacities, will help summarize why there are at least two very 
different types of cognitive capacities in animals. The very first step for having 
representations, and therefore a crude form of cognition, consists in the ability to 
extract regularities in the world, and to use them in the control of one's behavior. 
The animal possesses devices that respond to external stimuli according to their 
intensities ; it may also integrate those intensities, and monitor its output in 
adequate preestablished ways. For example, the aplysia will withdraw its siphon 
in order to prevent functional damage. Or the coastal snail will make its way to the 
surface using several taxes. But all the information that the animal uses is located 
at the surface of its receptors. It can only process proximal stimuli, and therefore 
fails to respond to external facts. What it does is adjust selectively to its 
environment on the basis of rudimentary input-output correlations. Although the 
capacity for integrating inputs and for elementary learning (habituation and 
sensitization) allows some kind of flexibility in behavior for reacting to present 
inputs, still the animal does not have any capacity for storing information on the 
world, neither can it plan to act on it. The second step in the evolution of 
representational capacity puts an animal in a position where  responding to 
external conditions as such  is not any more a structural impossibility. The animal 
now possesses a perceptual system that has the means for extracting invariants in 
the world that can be of significance for its own survival. It can calibrate its own 
receptors to achieve a spatially coherent picture of the world, and if necessary, 
recalibrate them. Now this perceptual capacity does not provide yet such a system 
with mental representations.
Having a system of mental representations obviously goes beyond  having a 
spatially coherent perceptual layout. But  an animal that already has "objective" 
perceptual and mnemonic capacities is not far from acquiring the ability to extract 
from  inputs the types of  invariants that should influence present and future 
behavior, i.e. to make concepts. Once spatial organization of perception has been 
reached, proto-objects and proto-events are up for grabs. A proto-object is some 
invariant in space, with several modal properties ; a proto-event is some invariant 
in time, with particular dynamic properties affecting a given object. Having these 
anchors is the source of a substantial modification for learning and planning 
capacities. It is one of the essential conditions that make  mental representation 
possible.
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